机关党组织的工作机制:政府拯救温州的药方有效吗？

2011年 11月 24日 11:28 政府拯救温州的药方有效吗？
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最近，似乎所有目光都聚焦在这座被称为中国资本主义复兴摇篮的城市身上，大家都在寻找有关中国经济前景的线索。这座城市深受信贷紧缩的严重冲击。紧缩的信贷令欠债的老板纷纷出逃躲债，还有好几位老板已经自杀。挖掘的越深入，这件事情越能说明中国经济未来将会遇到的麻烦。

越来越多的评论人士开始相信这一事实，即信贷紧缩仅仅助推了已经在发挥作用的经济力量。最大的问题在于国外竞争加剧压低了利润率。随着越南等国抢走的原本属于中国的出口订单数量越来越多，企业借入资金以度过难关。信贷收缩更令这些企业倒闭。

Gilles Sabrie for The Wall Street Journal温州是中国民营经济诞生地，这里的企业家曾豪掷千金购买宾利和直升机。随着出口放缓、房价下滑等问题接踵而至，这里的神秘感正在消失。但这只是故事的一个方面。故事的另一面和温州企业家最初试图应对海外压力的方法有关。从这个角度考虑，此事看起来更糟。

失去核心业务竞争力的企业试图向价值链上游转移，不过方法并不讨巧。电气公司安德利集团的叶玄宝（音）说，发生当前问题的根本原因在于低利润促使企业投资其它产业。叶玄宝强调说，由于在新进入的产业没有经验，这只是盲目投资。他的观点和很多温州人对负债老板的看法一致。

浙江信泰集团就是一个很好的例子。2008年，在其核心业务眼镜制造利润微薄的情况下，创始人兼董事长胡福林决定转向，进军太阳能电池板产业。由于享受税收减免的优惠政策，据说胡福林从银行贷出大笔款项，匆匆建起了三座工厂。据该公司网站介绍，信泰集团开始生产太阳能单晶硅、太阳能多晶硅、太阳能电池及太阳能组件系统等光伏产品。

该公司网站自信地预测其太阳能电池板业务预计2011年达成600兆瓦，年产能70亿人民币。但绿色市场并没有胡福林想象的那样成熟，他没能收回投资。其他一些看好太阳能电池板业务的企业也碰到类似问题。面对无法偿还的20亿元债务（约合3.14亿美元），9月中旬胡福林出逃美国，躲债20天。

附近一家企业的老板吴旭升告诉《新快报》，信泰集团的太阳能电池板业务所以失败，主要是因为胡福林不了解这个行业。吴旭升又说，这个行业，按照一般规律，从投资到产生盈利，能在四年内收回成本并有所盈利，已超出想象。

相关阅读博客：温州民间信贷何以根深蒂固？
2011：温州流年不利？
专栏：中国正在悄悄打开流动性闸门
观点：温州之困不仅源自信贷紧缩
专栏：民间借贷崩盘对A股有害无利
博客：我们救温州，还是温州救中国？
专栏：温州是第一张倒下的多米诺骨牌吗？向价值链上游转移失败的例子也不止局限于政府鼓励的产业。浙江永久弹簧制造有限公司曾经是一家失败的金属弹簧制造商，现在其铁矿开采业务也遭遇失败。

随着金属弹簧的利润下滑，永久弹簧创始人、董事长高志胜大举借债，投资人民币6,000万元（合940万美元）从事铁矿开采。在毫无采矿业经验的情况下，高志胜依靠朋友做重要决策，比如在哪里买地。其中的一些朋友曾在云南省和贵州省开矿。2008年，高志胜投资于他认为富含铁的一个地方，结果却发现根本没有铁。

一家电子厂经理叶乐兵（音）说，时间和地点都不对。叶乐兵人脉很广，对温州的企业发展非常关注。或许高志胜进军采矿业之举只是为给猖獗的炒房活动打掩护。今年9月高志胜无力偿债，他也和胡福林一样跑路了。一些地下钱庄的老板据说把他的女儿绑架了三天，之后高志胜才回到了温州。永久弹簧没有回复记者请求置评的电话、电子邮件和挂号信。

这类企业倒闭的原因说法不一。胡福林返回温州后在政府组织下接受《温州日报》采访时，他承认在太阳能板业务上过于草率鲁莽，他说他“想一口吃个胖子”。官方的说法是，这类错误是贪婪加上无节制放贷的结果。

不过，温州的老板看到的教训却不同。电子厂经理叶乐兵说，我认为大家不应该指责民间借贷，他们是因为有需求才出现的。像信泰集团这样尝试向新行业扩张的做法是一种试图向价值链上游转移的孤注一掷的做法。这也是北京看似希望企业进行的尝试──可以消除难以解决的破产、失业和社会不稳定。

最近的事件显示出，一些公司尽管有着政府的扶持，仍无法实现业务的转型。问题在于专业技术。就算是在劳动密集型、低附加值的制造业起家的精明管理人士也难以学会高附加值行业的门道。

这一事实可能使北京最近挽救温州企业的举措（包括优惠贷款条件和免除债务）产生适得其反的效果。破产是把资产从无法继续对其进行有效利用的管理者手中重新配置给有此能力的新所有者的最有效方法。

北京可能很快不得不面对温州问题的全面爆发，这意味着北京也将有一个机会最终采取正确的措施。叶乐兵说，元旦是最危险的时候，因为元旦是企业必须发工资、偿还贷款的时候。他说，经常有企业在元旦倒闭，但今年企业在元旦前就有可能破产。温州中小企业发展促进会会长周德文说，明年1月前，可能将有40%的工厂不得不停产。

如果下个月将有一些企业破产，就让他们破产好了。政府应该允许奄奄一息的企业有序地解体。如果北京有允许企业破产的勇气，这种刺激将帮助中国开始向价值链上游转移。

（编者按：本文作者Christopher Carothers是《亚洲华尔街日报》评论版的普林斯顿亚洲(Princeton-in-Asia)研究员。）

The Wrong Way to Fix Wenzhou

CHRISTOPHER CAROTHERS

Lately it seems that all eyes are on this city, the cradle of China's capitalist resurgence, for clues about the country's economic future. The area has been especially hard-hit by a credit crunch that has seen 90 indebted business owners take flight from creditors, while several others have committed suicide. The deeper one digs, the more this episode says about trouble ahead for the broader economy.

A growing number of commentators are picking up on the fact that the credit squeeze has merely aided and abetted economic forces that already were at work. The biggest is mounting competition from abroad that cuts profit margins. Companies have been borrowing just to stay afloat as Vietnam and other countries capture a growing share of export orders that used to go to China. Now they have been forced under by the credit contraction.

That's only part of the story, however. Another relates to the way Wenzhou's entrepreneurs initially tried to respond to those pressures from overseas. Considered from this angle, the news looks even worse.

Companies that become uncompetitive in their core business lines tried clumsily to claw their way up the value chain. 'The fundamental reason for the current situation,' says Ye Xuanbao of electronics manufacturer Andeli Group, 'is that low profits pushed the companies to invest in other industries.' With no experience in the new fields, 'it was blind investment,' emphasizes Mr. Ye, echoing a sentiment many in Wenzhou have about the indebted bosses.

Zhejiang Center Group is a case in point. In 2008, faced with slim profits in its core business of manufacturing eyewear, founder and chairman Hu Fulin decided to shift into . . . solar panels. With tax breaks in hand, Mr. Hu allegedly took out large loans and rushed to build three factories. According to the company website, it started producing 'solar energy silicon panels, solar energy batteries and solar energy systems.'

The company website triumphantly predicts producing 'up to 600 megawatts in 2011' with 'yearly revenue at 7 billion RMB' ($1.1 billion) But the green market was not as ripe as Mr. Hu imagined, and he failed to recover his investment. Some of the other solar panel bulls have had similar problems. Facing an unpayable debt of two billion yuan ($314 million) in mid-September, Mr. Hu fled to the United States for 20 days.

Center Group's solar panel adventure failed because Mr. Hu didn't understand the business, Wu Xusheng, owner of a neighboring business, told the local Xinkuai Newspaper. 'In this field, normally speaking . . . making back your investment in even four years already stretches the imagination.'

Nor is the failure to move up the value chain confined to industries encouraged by the government. Forever Springs Manufacturing Company used to be a failing manufacturer of metal springs. Now it's a failed iron miner.

With metal springs profits down, founder and board chairman Gao Zhifeng borrowed big to make a 60 million yuan ($9.4 million) investment in iron mining. With no experience in mining, Mr. Gao relied on friends, some of whom had opened mines in Kunming and Guizhou Provinces, to make key decisions like where to buy land. In 2008 Mr. Gao invested in what he supposed was an iron-rich area, only to discover there was hardly any iron at all.

'Neither the time nor place was right,' says Ye Lebing, the well-connected manager of an electronics factory who follows Wenzhou business developments closely. Perhaps Mr. Gao's mining move was just a cover for property speculation, which is rampant. When he couldn't pay back his loans in September, Mr. Gao, like Mr. Hu, fled. Mr. Gao returned after some gray market creditors allegedly kidnapped his daughter for three days. Forever Springs did not respond to requests for comment via phone, email and registered mail.

The cause of such business failures is a matter of debate. In a government-orchestrated interview with Wenzhou Daily after his return to Wenzhou, Mr. Hu confessed his rashness with solar panels, saying he 'tried to grow fat with just one bite.' The official line is that this kind of mistake bubbled up from a noxious mix of greed and unregulated lending.

But Wenzhou bosses see a different lesson. 'I don't think people should blame underground lenders, they serve a need,' Mr. Ye, the electronics executive, says. Expansion into new industries, like the kind Center Group attempted, is a desperate attempt to move up the value chain. It's also the kind of attempt Beijing seems to hope will happen岸sans messy bankruptcies, unemployment or social unrest.

Recent events show some companies, despite government 'help,' can't make the transition. The problem is expertise. Even smart managers who cut their teeth in labor-intensive, low-value-added manufacturing struggle to learn the ropes in higher-value-added businesses.

This fact raises the prospect that Beijing's recent moves to bail out Wenzhou firms岸preferential loan terms and debt forgiveness岸will be counterproductive. Bankruptcy is the most effective way to reallocate assets from managers who no longer can use them profitably to new owners who can.

Beijing may soon have to confront the full scale of the Wenzhou problem, which means it also will have an opportunity finally to do the right thing. 'New Year is the most dangerous time,' Ye Lebing says, because that's when businesses must pay salaries and pay back loans. New Year always sees some businesses fail, 'but this year companies are going under before New Year' he notes. Zhou Dewen, head of Wenzhou's Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Promotion Association, has said 40% of factories may have to halt production by January.

If some bankruptcies are coming next month, let them. The government should allow orderly dissolution for dying businesses. That stimulation would help China start moving up the value chain, if Beijing has the courage.

Mr. Carothers is a Princeton-in-Asia fellow at The Wall Street Journal Asia editorial page.