沙特皇室奢侈生活图:欧元的未来 (双语)

BOND markets have scorned the Euro 85 billion ($113 billion) bail-out offered to Ireland on November 28th. Yields have risen not just for Ireland but for Portugal, Spain, Italy and even Belgium. The euro has fallen—again. As one botched rescue follows another, solemn vows from European Union leaders that a break-up of the single currency is unthinkable and impossible have lost their power to convince. And that is leading many to question whether the euro can survive.

债券市场对11月28日提供给爱尔兰的850亿欧元（1130亿美元）援助资金不屑一顾。债券收益率不仅在爱尔兰，也在葡萄牙，西班牙，意大利，甚至比利时都有增长。欧元继续下挫。粗制滥造的援救方案一个接着一个；欧盟领导人信誓旦旦地宣称，单一货币的崩溃既无法想象，也毫无可能。现在看来，这种说法已难以让人信服；从而导致许多人对欧元是否可以继续存在持怀疑态度。

The case against it is that European citizens can no longer live under its yoke. In Europe's periphery some are yearning to be spared the years of grinding austerity that may be needed for wages and prices to become competitive. In the German-dominated core they are fed up with paying for other countries' fecklessness and they fear that, as creditors, they will suffer if the European Central Bank (ECB) inflates away the laggards' debts. Deep down lurks the sullen suspicion that this is a drama that the euro zone may be condemned to relive time and again. So why not get out now?

同欧盟领导人的说法相对的是，欧洲居民再也无法忍受欧元的束缚。欧洲外围的一些国家都一直渴望不用采取持续多年的令人难以忍受的紧缩措施。这些紧缩措施对形成具有竞争力的工资和价格很有必要。在德国领导的中心国中，人们已经厌倦了为其他国家不负责任的行为付代价的做法。作为债权人的他们担心，如果欧洲央行（ECB）用通货膨胀冲销经济落后国家的债务，他们就会受牵连。人们的内心深处都有一丝疑虑，欧元区也许被宣判要重新来过。所以，为什么现在不离开呢？

The rock and the hard place
两难局面

Financial history is littered with events that turned from the unthinkable to the inevitable with breathtaking speed: Britain left the gold standard in 1931, Argentina abandoned its dollar peg in January 2002. But a collapse of the euro would bring with it unprecedented technical, economic and political costs (see article).

金融历史上充满着从难以想象急速转变到不可避免的事件：1931年，英国退出金本位；2002年1月，阿根廷放弃盯住美元的汇率制度。然而，无论从技术上、经济上还是政治上来说，欧元区瓦解的代价都是史无前例得。

A break-up might happen in one of two ways. One or more weak members (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, perhaps Spain) might leave, presumably to devalue their new currency. Or a fed-up Germany, possibly joined by the Netherlands and Austria, could decide to junk the euro and restore the D-mark, which would then appreciate.

欧元区的崩溃也许以两种方式之一发生。一个或更多的弱势成员国（希腊，爱尔兰，葡萄牙，也许还有西班牙）可能离开，它们的新货币大概会贬值。或者是受够了的德国（也许同荷兰和奥地利一起）决定抛弃欧元，恢复使用彼时可能升值的德国马克。

In either case, the costs would be enormous. For a start, the technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency, reprogramming computers and vending machines, minting coins and printing notes are huge (three years' preparation was needed for the euro). Any hint that a weak country was about to leave would lead to runs on deposits, further weakening troubled banks. That would result in capital controls and perhaps limits on bank withdrawals, which in turn would strangle commerce. Leavers would be cut off from foreign finance, perhaps for years, further starving their economies of funds.

无论哪种情况发生，代价都非常昂贵。首先，重新引入一国货币，重新编写电脑系统和贩卖机，铸造硬币，印刷纸币的技术性困难难以克服（欧元的引入经历了3年的准备期）。任何对弱势国家准备离开的暗示都会引起储蓄增加，从而更进一步拖垮陷入困境的银行；导致银行对资金加以控制，也许对提款也设置限制，最终扼杀商业活动。离开的国家也许几年之内都无法获得境外资金的援助，它们对推动经济发展的资金将更加渴求。

The calculation would be only slightly better if the euro escapee were Germany. Again, there would be bank runs in Europe as depositors fled weaker countries, leading to the reintroduction of capital controls. Even if German banks gained deposits, their large euro-zone assets would be marked down: Germany, remember, is the system's biggest creditor. Lastly, German exporters, having been big beneficiaries of a more stable single currency, would howl at being landed once again with a sharply rising D-mark.

如果德国离开欧元区，情况则会稍好一点。随着存款人逃离弱势国家，欧洲必然会存在一家存款人向往的银行，导致资金控制的重新引入。即使德国银行获得存款，它们巨大的欧元区资产会被减值：记住，德国是该体制最大的债权国。最后，在更加稳定的单一货币制度下获益最多的德国出口企业，会因为再一次被急剧升值的德国马克所拖累而咬牙切齿。

If the economics of pulling apart the euro look dubious, the politics risks detonating a chain reaction that would threaten the fabric of the single market and the EU itself. The EU and the euro have been Germany's post-war anchors. If it abandoned the currency, at huge cost, and left the rest of the euro zone to fend for itself, its commitment to the EU would be in serious doubt.

如果从经济上讲，欧元区的解体看似令人怀疑，那么引爆这一连锁反应的政治风险将威胁单一市场的基础以及欧盟本身。欧盟和欧元一直以来都是德国战后的转折点。如果德国以巨大代价放弃欧元，让欧元区其他成员自给自足，则它对欧盟的承诺会引发强烈质疑。

If a weaker country left, risking not just European banks but also the currency, it would become a pariah exporting its pain to its neighbours. Once capital controls were in place Europe's financial markets would be in tatters and it would be hard to preserve cross-border European trade. The collapse of the single market, which has done more than anything else to knit Europe together, would threaten the EU itself.

如果一个弱势国家离开，其结果不仅仅是欧洲银行，欧元也会面临风险。该弱国也会因其困境波及邻国而遭受唾弃。一旦资金控制就位，欧洲的金融市场定如一团乱麻，要保持欧洲地区跨境贸易绝非易事。联合欧洲最大的贡献者-单一市场-的崩溃，会威胁到欧盟本身。

However much countries may now regret joining the euro, leaving it does not make sense. But the fact that it ought to survive does not mean that it will. And unless Europe's leaders move further and faster, it might not.

大多数国家现在也许拒绝加入欧盟，然而，离开欧盟毫无意义。但是，欧盟一定要生存下去并不表示它就会生存下去。除非欧洲领导人采取更进一步的快速行动，欧盟的生存希望就很渺茫。

Salvaging a single currency
拯救单一货币

Europe's leaders have been slow and timid in response to market pressures. Greece and now Ireland have forced them, reluctantly, into bail-outs. Only belatedly have they recognised that some countries are not just in need of bridging loans to tide them over, but may be unable to repay their debts. That means that some pain will have to be inflicted on bondholders.

欧洲领导人一直都谨小慎微地应对市场压力。希腊以及现在的爱尔兰迫使他们很勉强地出资援助。直到最近，他们才意识到，一些国家不仅仅需要过渡性贷款帮助它们度过难关，它们甚至无法偿还债务。这就意味着，债券持有人也会承担一些损失。

This will be easier to achieve now that euro-zone governments have agreed that sovereign-debt issues after 2013 should contain collective-action clauses, which stop hold-out investors blocking deals. The Irish have already imposed "haircuts" on subordinated-debt holders in their banks, though they were stopped from doing this for senior bondholders (see article). Such talk is inevitably unpopular in the markets. Yet losses must be possible if investors are to distinguish between sovereign-debt issuers.

现在要做到这点就相对容易了。欧元区政府一致商定，2013年之后的主权债务问题应当包含一项共同行动的条款。该条款阻止拒不合作的投资人妨碍交易。爱尔兰现在已经对银行次级债持有人强硬“理发”，但不会对高级债券持有人采取相同的做法。如此的说法必然会遭到市场的冷遇。然而，如果投资者将要区分主权债务发行人的话，损失是肯定得。

The crisis should also have brought home to weak deficit countries the high cost of their failure to make the reforms to labour and product markets, and to welfare systems, necessary to restore their lost competitiveness. Even if they left the euro, they would have to take such steps to thrive. Within it, reform would not just revive moribund economies, but also create the chance of future growth to safeguard the single currency. Reform would be easier if surplus countries (ie, Germany) did more to boost their own domestic demand.

此次金融危机同时让弱势的债务国认识到，一些旨在恢复失去的竞争力的改革一旦失败的高昂成本。这些改革包括：劳动力和产品市场改革以及福利体制改革。即使它们脱离欧元，它们同样需要采取这些步骤来生存，繁荣。呆在欧元区内，改革就不仅仅是复兴萎靡不振的经济，同时也要创造未来增长的机遇以保卫单一货币。如果盈余国家（如德国）更有力地拉动内需，改革就会相对容易些。

Lastly, if the euro is to survive, creditor countries need to give more aid to deficit countries. They could do this directly, or the ECB could provide liquidity to banks or buy up government bonds before they fall too far. It has indicated it may start doing the latter again. Germany hates the idea of more aid to debtor countries (see article)—hence its slowness to accept bail-outs and its determination to penalise bondholders. Its unwillingness to subsidise the weak and profligate is understandable; but the alternative is worse.

最后，如果欧元继续存活，债权国需要提供更多的援助给债务国。它们可以直接这么做，或者欧洲央行为银行提供流动性，抑或在政府债券大幅下跌以前大量收购。有迹象表明，央行也许会采取后一种行动。德国憎恶为债务国提供更多援助的想法-接受援助的迟钝，惩罚债券持有人的决心。它对资助弱势和肆意挥霍的国家的不情愿可以理解；但是，另外的选择只会更遭。

Breaking up the euro is not unthinkable, just very costly. Because they refuse to face up to the possibility that it might happen, Europe's leaders are failing to take the measures necessary to avert it.

欧元的解体难以想象，代价及其昂贵。由于欧洲领导人拒绝面对欧元解体的可能性，他们无法采取必需的措施避免这一可能。