中国金融体系的真正风险

The recent assessment of China’s financial stability by the International Monetary Fund highlights increasing vulnerabilities stemming from the government’s role in the lending process, and an inflexible interest rate policy. Those who regard weaknesses in the banking sector as a likely trigger for a financial collapse have railed against China’s negative real interest rates and the speculative activity this has spawned. They see the heavy reliance on credit expansion to stimulate the economy during the global financial crises as eventually leading to a surge in non-performing loans. All this is viewed as part of a strategy of financial repression that postpones the day when China’s big four state banks can operate as real commercial banks.

国际货币基金组织(IMF)最近对中国金融稳定性的评估突显出，中国政府在信贷过程中扮演的角色和不灵活的利率政策，正日益带来风险。那些认为银行部门的缺陷有可能引发金融崩盘的人，对中国的实际负利率和由之带来的大量投机活动提出了严厉指责。他们认为，在全球金融危机期间高度依赖信贷扩张来刺激经济的做法，最终会导致不良贷款的飙升。所有这些，都被看作金融压制战略的一部分，推迟了中国四大国有银行成为真正的商业银行那一天的到来。

But focusing on emerging financial risks is a case of treating the symptoms of the problem, rather than understanding and dealing with its origins. When Deng Xiaoping launched his efforts decades ago to boost economic growth, he needed to secure the resources to ramp up investments along the coast. But the Communist party leader faced the reality that government revenues had fallen to only 11 per cent of gross domestic product by the mid-1990s and the only alternative was to tap household savings in the banking system. Although revenues have been increasing steadily, China’s national budget still amounts to only 25 per cent of GDP, compared with an average of 35 per cent for other middle income countries and over 40 per cent for OECD economies.

但专注于这些浮现的金融风险，实际上只是从问题的表面症状着手，而没有理解和着眼于它的根源。数十年前，当邓小平启动刺激经济增长的改革措施的时候，他需要获得资源来扩大沿海地区的投资。但这位共产党领导人面临一个现实：到20世纪90年代中期，政府收入已降至仅占国内生产总值(GDP)的11%，唯一的选择就是利用银行体系中的家庭储蓄。虽然此后政府收入一直稳步上升，但目前中国国家预算仍然只占GDP的25%，而其它中等收入国家的这一比率平均为35%，经合组织(OECD)经济体平均为40%以上。

With its responsibilities for providing a broad range of services for a mixed socialist economy, it is surprising how small China’s budgetary footprint actually is. Thus, Beijing has been using the financial system to fund public expenditure needs – many of which are not commercial in nature and would normally be undertaken through the budget. While this was unavoidable in the earlier years, it has turned out to be a politically attractive and effective option in dealing with the volatility of the global economy over the past decade. As such, these hidden banking losses are actually quasi-fiscal deficits, rather than traditional non-performing loans. While on paper China does not run major budgetary deficits, these quasi-fiscal deficits in the banking system have been accumulating over the years, awaiting the time (as in the past) when the non-performing loans are formally recognised and written off – with China’s substantial reserves and relatively low public debt ratios providing the cushion.

在这样一个社会主义混合经济中，由于政府承担着提供大量公共服务的责任，中国国家预算规模如此之小，实在令人称奇。所以，中国政府一直利用金融体系为公共开支提供资金——其中许多开支实际上并非商业性的，正常情况下应该由预算承担。虽然这种做法在早些年是不可避免的，但在过去10年应对全球经济动荡的实践中，它却成了一种诱人且有效的政治手段。因此，这些银行体系中的隐性亏损实际上是准财政赤字，而不是传统意义上的不良贷款。虽然中国在账面上没有严重的预算赤字，但这些银行体系中的准财政赤字多年来一直在积累，到了一定的时候（和过去一样），这些不良贷款会被正式确认并核销——中国的庞大储备和相对较低的公共债务比率会为此提供缓冲。

One cannot dispute that China needs to act on financial reforms, but the real challenge is for Beijing to recognise the importance of strengthening its fiscal system to undertake expenditure requirements in a more transparent and potentially less destabilising fashion. Unless the leadership takes this decision, admonitions for more flexible monetary policies and improved governance of key financial institutions will continue to fall on deaf ears.

中国需要进行金融改革，这一点无可辩驳，但北京方面的真正挑战是，承认增强财政体系、使之以更透明、更不易损害稳定的方式满足支出要求的重要性。除非领导人下决心这样做，否则关于中国应采取更灵活的货币政策、改善关键金融机构治理的劝告，将继续是对牛弹琴。

Unfortunately the budgetary problems that have paralysed both the eurozone and US do not help the case. Beijing is watching with amazement as political leaders across both continents struggle to forge the consensus needed to strengthen their countrys’ fiscal positions. This only reinforces China’s view that budgetary processes are too politically cumbersome to deal with the unpredictable nature of the global economy. It makes it all the more likely that Beijing will continue to use the banking system for purposes that textbooks never saw as appropriate.

不幸的是，使欧元区和美国都陷入瘫痪的预算问题，在此无法被引以为鉴。中国政府惊讶地看着欧美各国政治领导人，为了达成加强本国财政状况的一致意见而苦苦挣扎。这种情况只是强化了中国的观点：在应对不可预测的全球经济方面，预算程序在政治上太碍事了。这使得如下情况的可能性进一步加大了：北京方面将继续利用银行体系，去做一些教科书上从不认为恰当的事。

The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and a former country director for the World Bank in China.

本文作者为卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment)高级研究员、前世界银行(World Bank)中国业务局局长。