巢湖去三河古镇怎么走:谁该为中国概念股问题负责-563.6-

谁该为中国概念股问题负责

A Chinese Listing Fitness Test

PAUL GILLIS

西方监管机构正在努力应对中国境外上市公司越来越多的欺诈行为。到目前为止，他们一直是关注于个案的解决。但这些丑闻应当让人们对西方市场上的中国概念股做出远更深刻的反思。

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基本问题在于，当前旨在保证公司适合上市的规则是不够的，没有起到保护投资者的作用，让他们远离连完全合法的中国公司都存在的巨大风险。最近的一个例子就反映了这方面的缺陷。

从各个方面来讲，世纪佳缘(Jiayuan.com)都是一家完全诚实的中国公司。它据说是中国最大的网络婚恋平台，5月份通过在纳斯达克(Nasdaq)上市融资7,800万美元。这家公司有一个远近闻名的品牌、一位聪明的创始人，和一个合理的商业模式。但即使是这样一家没有一丁点不端行为的公司，它的招股说明书当中，除了提到发展中国家一般都存在的法治不明朗等风险外，还有另外一些值得警惕的地方。

比如，世纪佳缘在公司结构和品牌上面所做的法务处理似乎就存在一些问题。由于外资在技术意义上不能投资中国的互联网服务行业，世纪佳缘就建立了一个“可变利益实体”(VIE)。这是很多中国概念股都有的一个特征。

根据这个结构，公司的运营部分和海外上市部分在技术意义上是两个完全分开的实体。中国人控制的部分同上市部分签署一系列转让收入的合同，让两家公司的账簿能够根据美国会计准则合为一体。这是一种高风险结构，因为外国股东实际上并没有真正持有相关中国公司的股份。

但在VIE结构以外，世纪佳缘还披露了多个重要的风险。其中一个重大风险与世纪佳缘的离岸公司合规问题有关。中国2006年发布的一个规定要求，中国居民在设立离岸公司之前，要先在国家外汇管理局登记。世纪佳缘的招股说明书说，其创始团队在设立VIE结构所用离岸实体的时候没有做到这一点。

当世纪佳缘力图在IPO前夕纠正这一问题时，国家外汇管理局却不给机会。这差一点就让世纪佳缘丢掉了营业执照，直到最后一刻经过一番争吵，把VIE结构中北京部分的控制权划转到上海一个在向外管局登记时没有遇到麻烦的世纪佳缘实体，才化险为夷。但这并没有彻底解决问题。世纪佳缘说目前它已经完成必要的登记，但有一个问题还没有回答：为什么在这个可能事关生死的问题都还没有解决的时候，就把IPO推向了市场？

在向投资者进行推介的时候，世纪佳缘公司也指出，其品牌名称和商标“世纪佳缘”是中国最知名且最值得信赖的网络婚恋交友品牌。但前提是该公司拥有这一品牌。招股说明书中披露说，该公司2003年开始使用这一品牌时并未对这一商标进行注册。

当该公司高管在2007年想要注册商标的时候，他们发现这个商标早在2005年就已经被人注册了（商标注册人的身份未被披露，但此人很可能是想通过将商标转让给世纪佳缘而从中获利）。世纪佳缘想要夺回在2005年被人注册的商标，但中国的法律制度在这类案件上仍然存在空白，所以争议结果是未知的。投资者应该质疑的是，此类和其它影响较小的商标纠纷是否早该在首次公开募股前就已经处理清楚。

请记住，除了这些被充分披露的风险，世纪佳缘看上去是一家名副其实的公司，即一家具备盈利能力的大型婚恋交友网站运营商。前面指出的这些潜在问题也并不奇怪。在美国上市的中国公司提交给SEC的备案文件中充满了类似的怪事。

所以，通过对这一个案的研究，让我们对参与其中的西方市场专业人士所起到的作用提出质疑。到目前为止，法律上对承销商、律师和会计师提出的惟一要求是披露相关风险。但当不确定性大到一定程度的时候，难道不应该暂停IPO吗？

我认为应该如此。目前，按照要求，审计师本应评估一家公司是否具有持续经营的能力，但审计师往往只关注企业的财务实力，而不是经营的可持续性。律师和承销商要做的只是“尽量”披露风险，让投资者报最乐观的希望。

但审计的基本目的应该是给投资者提供有关一家公司财务状况和生存能力的可靠信息。现在该是对招股说明书中所披露的风险的实际严重程度进行全面评估的时候了。在世纪佳缘的案例中，这样的评估本应指出，尽管该公司目前尚能盈利，但公司的持续经营能力面临严重的法律风险。

美国上市公司会计监管委员会（PCAOB）正在考虑出台一个规则，给予审计师更多的空间，以全面看待一家公司面临的各种风险，从而有助于推行全面评估。从监管在美上市的中国企业的角度来看，此类规定将是监管方面的重大进展。眼下投资者在问的一个问题是：他们是在欺诈吗？而投资者本应该问的是：他们到底是否具备上市的资质？

（编者注：保罗?吉利斯是北京大学光华管理学院的访问教授。）

PAUL GILLIS

Western regulators are grappling with a growing list of frauds at Chinese companies listed overseas. So far they have focused on cleaning up individual cases. But these scandals should prompt a much deeper rethink about Chinese listings in Western markets.

The basic problem is that existing rules aimed at ensuring the suitability of companies for listing are inadequate and aren't protecting investors from the huge risks that exist even at Chinese companies that are entirely legitimate. A recent example illustrates the pitfalls.

Jiayuan.com is by all accounts an entirely above-board Chinese company. It's purportedly China's largest online dating platform, and it raised $78 million in a Nasdaq listing (ticker symbol: DATE) in May. It boasts a famous brand name, a smart founder and a plausible business model. Yet even for this company, where there is not a whiff of any misdeed, the prospectus still included some red flags beyond the standard developing-country disclaimers about uncertain rule of law and the like.

Consider what seems to have been some questionable lawyering surrounding Jiayuan.com's corporate structure and brand. Because foreign investment is technically forbidden in the Internet services sector, Jiayuan.com created a 'variable-interest entity,' or VIE─a common feature of many Chinese listings.

Under this structure, the operating part of the company and the overseas listed part technically are two completely separate entities. The Chinese-owned part signs a series of contracts with the listed entity to transfer revenues in a way that allows the books of the two companies to be consolidated under U.S. accounting rules. It's a risky structure since the foreign shareholders don't actually own the Chinese company.

But Jiayuan.com also disclosed several important risks beyond its VIE structure. A big one involved the company's compliance with regulations for offshore companies. A rule issued in 2006 requires Chinese residents to register with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) before setting up offshore companies. Jiayuan's prospectus said its founders failed to do this when they created the offshore entities used in the VIE structure.

When the company attempted to rectify this problem prior to the IPO, SAFE wouldn't let it. This very nearly cost the company its business license, until some last-minute wrangling shifted control of the Beijing-based portions of the VIE structure to a separate Jiayuan entity based in Shanghai, which was not being challenged on its SAFE registrations. But this wasn't a definitive solution. Jiayuan says it has now completed the required registrations, but the question remains: Why was the IPO brought to market before this potentially fatal problem was resolved?

In its pitch to investors, Jiayuan also noted that its brand name and logo, Shiji Jiayuan, is the most well-known and trusted online dating brand in China. If only the company owned it. The prospectus disclosed that the company had not obtained a trademark registration for the brand when they started using it in 2003.

When executives got around to applying in 2007, they discovered someone had already registered the brand in 2005. (The identity of this registrant is not disclosed, but it could well be a 'trademark troll' who hoped to sell Jiayuan its own brand identity back.) The company is fighting that 2005 trademark, but China's legal system still is new to this kind of case and the outcome is uncertain. One must question whether this and other, smaller, trademark problems should have been cleaned up long before the IPO.

Remember, other than these fully disclosed risks, Jiayuan appears to be exactly what it says it is─a profitable operator of a big dating site. Nor are such potential problems unusual. SEC filings of U.S.-listed Chinese companies are filled with similar oddities.

So this case study raises the question of the role of Western market professionals in all this. Up to now, the only legal requirement for underwriters, lawyers and accountants has been to disclose the relevant risks. But should uncertainties of sufficient magnitude stop an offering completely?

They probably should. Right now, auditors are required to assess whether a company is likely to continue as a going concern, but they tend to focus only on financial strength rather than sustainability. The approach of the lawyers and underwriters is to 'adequately' disclose the risks and let investors hope for the best.

But the basic purpose of an audit is to give investors firm insight about the financial position, and thus the viability, of a company. It's time to include a holistic assessment of the actual severity of the risks disclosed in the prospectus. In Jiayuan.com's case, such an assessment might have noted the serious legal threats to the company's continued existence despite its profitability.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is contemplating a rule that would facilitate this kind of assessment by giving auditors greater scope to look at the risks facing a company as a whole. Such a rule would be important regulatory progress from the perspective of policing Chinese listings. The question people are asking right now is 'Are they frauds?' The question should be, 'Are they fit to list at all?'

(Mr. Gillis is a visiting professor at the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University. )